Using monthly GDP forecasts from Consensus Economics Inc. for 18 developed countries reported over 24 different forecast horizons during 1989-2004, we find that the survey forecasts do not have much value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months.
Introduction
How far ahead into the future do macroeconomic forecasts have value and how does the information content of forecasts change over forecast horizon is a question that has been the focus of various studies.
1 Most of these studies, however, provide measures for the information content of optimal forecasts over forecast horizons by modeling the actual data generating process. For example, Öller (1985) and Galbraith (2003) provide estimates of the length of the forecast horizon at which the optimal forecasts contain information by assuming that the actual process follows an ARIMA process. Similarly, Oke and Öller (1999) provide estimates by modeling the actual process using VARMA process. Granger (1996) pointed out that a feature that will provide limits to how far ahead one can forecast is when the (forecastable) signal gets lost in the (unforecastable) noise.
In other words, forecasts will not provide any information when the measurement errors start to make the information content of signals negligible compared to noise. In reality, the measurement errors are not only driven by the level of noise attributed to the data generating process but also to other factors. For example, delays in data releases and data revisions, not to mention structural breaks that are only detectable ex post, are some of the factors that may affect the information content of real-time forecasts. In these situations, a forecaster will seem to respond to information that is relevant but also to what is not. These factors do not cause problems in ex post analysis of historical data but may induce serious deformation in the information content of real-time forecasts.
Only a handful of studies have used real-time survey data to estimate the information content of forecasts (e.g., Mills and Pepper, 1999; Vuchelen and Gutierrez, 2005) , and no one has examined the dynamics of how the information content of forecasts change over horizons and how new information increases the information value of forecasts. However, understanding the changes in the information content of forecasts over horizons and, for example, the timing of the arrival of the most important information is critical for both the forecasters and their clients. It is well known that many forecasting agencies like the OECD, Blue Chip, etc. produce forecasts several times a year from an initial 24-month ahead forecast. Some knowledge on the dynamics of information accumulation over forecast horizons can provide forecasters with an important parameter in their selection of the timing and the frequency in the use of forecasting service. For the clients of forecasting firms, the information content of forecasts can be an important consideration in their decisions on how to use and when to use these forecasts.
In this study we address these issues using 15 years of monthly private sector forecast data for 18 developed countries reported over 24 different forecast horizons. We study various characteristics of real GDP growth forecasts over forecast horizons and their differences across countries, and propose two measures for the content of new information in forecasts. We find that the flow of new information to year-over-year GDP growth forecasts follows a hump-shaped curve over horizons with a peak point when the forecast horizon is around 14 months.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data.
Section 3 discusses certain stylized facts on the evolution of forecasts in a cross-country setting, and reports estimates on the flow of new information at various horizons using two alternative approaches. Section 4 concludes.
Data
In this study three data sets are used. The main data of the study on real GDP forecasts come from the Consensus Economics, Inc. The second and third data sets contain the actual data series but with different vintages. Our historical data for real GDP growth rates (to calculate the 5-year GDP growth averages and to model the actual GDP The details of the data sets follow.
Since October 1989, the Consensus Economics Inc. has been polling more than 600 forecasters each month and recording their forecasts for principal macroeconomic variables (including GDP growth, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates) for a large number of countries. Forecasts are made for the current year (based on partial information about developments in that year) and for the following year. The number of panelists ranges from 10 to 30 for most of the countries, and for the major industrialized countries the panelists are based in countries they forecast.
We study the consensus forecasts of annual average real GDP growth. Survey respondents make their first forecasts when there are 24 months to the end of the year they are forecasting; that is, they start forecasting GDP growth in January of the previous year, and their last forecast is reported in the beginning of December of the target year. for Germany. In our data sample, the most significant changes were for Germany. While West Germany's real GNP growth was being forecast through December 1992, after January 1993 the forecast variable became real GDP of West Germany. In addition, unified Germany's GDP growth was added to the survey and West Germany's GDP forecast was removed in May 1997.
In order to evaluate the forecast errors correctly, the forecasts should be matched with the actual data being forecast. It is well documented in the literature that data revisions may have an important impact on the perceived performance of the forecasters.
Since forecasters cannot possibly be aware of data revisions after they report their forecasts, we use an early revision as the actual value, which is compiled from the midyear reports of OECD Economic Outlook immediately following the target year. But because of the changes in definitions of target variables (e.g., GNP to GDP or West Germany to Unified Germany) some of the data are not available in the June issues of 2 There are only a very few of studies that have used the Consensus Forecasts data set. These are Artis and Zhang (1997) , Batchelor (2001) , Harvey, Leybourne and Newbold (2001) , Loungani (2001) , Juhn and Loungani (2002) , Gallo, Granger and Jeon (2002) , and Isiklar, Lahiri and Loungani (2006) . However, none of these studies consider the empirical findings analyzed in this paper.
OECD Economic Outlook. We collected these missing data from the original sources, 
Evolution of Fixed-Target Forecasts over Horizons
Figure 1 presents the reported forecasts and the realized actual values between 1991 and 2002. Each country's forecasts are divided into three separate panels, which are located horizontally in the figures. Plots start when the forecast horizon is 24, which is reported in January of the previous year, and end when the forecast horizon is 0, which gives the actual realization. Gallo et al. (2002) presented this type of graphs for 1993-96
and for three major countries: U.S., U.K., and Japan. We can now examine certain stylized characteristics of the forecast evolution in greater depth.
First, note that for the first six months or so (i.e., for horizons 24 to 18 months), the consensus forecasts do not seem to change very much. This empirical observation leads us to believe that over these horizons, forecasters do not receive dependable information to revise their forecasts systematically. There are important exceptions, however. For the target year 1994, forecasts for Belgium, France, Ireland, and Spain were active from the beginning.
Second, except for Ireland and Japan, the initial forecasts for all other countries seem to be starting from a relatively narrow band and then tend to diverge from these initial starting points. For example, for Austria, Belgium, Denmark and several other countries 24-month ahead forecasts are located between 2 percent and 3 percent, and as information is accumulated these forecasts tend to move towards their final destination.
One may conjecture that these initial long-term forecasts are nothing but Third, Gallo et al. (2002) noted that the consensus forecasts sometimes do not converge to the right target value due to possible copycat behavior by non-dominant forecasters. In our more comprehensive data set, even though we see some indication of such behavior in certain years for some countries, evidence is not pervasive. For Ireland the one-month ahead forecasts underestimated the targets repeatedly, but this can be explained by the exceptional Irish growth during the nineties. As documented by them, and we also find in Figure 1 , U.S. growth for 1995 was seriously overestimated even a month before the end of the target. The last US consensus forecast for 1995 was 3.24% whereas the actual growth based on July revision was 2.03%. This again can be explained by the fact that in the U.S., 1995 was a sudden unanticipated growth slowdown year.
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All in all, a close look at these graphs reveals certain undeniable regularities on how the fixed-target forecasts evolve over time. We now proceed to examine more rigorously the timing of the arrival of important information when forecasters break away from their initial estimates.
Forecast variance and forecast horizons
Forecasts presented in Figure 1 This observation is confirmed more clearly in Figure 2 , where we present the sample variances of the forecasts, i.e., ∑ −
forecast horizon. The last points in the charts, the points when the horizon is zero, give the variances of the actual values over the sample. As is seen from these figures, as the forecast horizon decreases the variance of the forecast steadily increases. Another way of looking at this increasing variability of forecasts is that as forecast horizon increases more information is accumulated and as more information is accumulated in the forecasts the variation of forecasts increases. This information accumulation process can be mimicked using a simple MA model for the data generating process. Suppose that the actual process has a moving average representation of order q so that
Then the optimal forecast at horizon h will be , ,
and the variance of the forecast is 2 ,
Similarly the variance of the forecast when forecast horizon is h-1 is 2 2 , 1 1
So when the forecast horizon is very long, i.e. several years, the forecasts tend to converge towards the mean of the process, and as information is accumulated, the forecasts change increasing the forecast variability. It is interesting to note that Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) used the same argument to conclude that U.S. GDP revisions are "news" rather than "noise". If successive revisions incorporate useful information about past GDP growth, then we will expect the successive revised figures to have more variance than the initial announcement.
While the positive slope in the forecast variance graphs is clear in all figures, there are some differences across countries that are worth mentioning. First, for some countries, e.g., Japan and the USA, the positive slope is not very distinct in the longer-run forecasts, especially when the horizon is more than 18 months. As just shown, the forecast variability increases because of the variability of the accumulated shocks, i.e.
Therefore, if forecast variability does not change much over several horizons as is the case, e.g., for Japanese forecasts for horizons from 24 to 15, this may mean that the information acquired 15 months ago does not have much impact on the actual value, i.e.
θ is small. Of course, this may also be related to the informational inefficiency of the forecasts. It is possible that even if the information over this period were important, the forecasters do not incorporate the information in their forecasts causing less than optimal variability in the forecasts. This issue will be addressed later on when we present forecast evaluation measures that are based on forecast errors over forecast horizons.
It is interesting to note that for some countries, the variation of actual values is much larger than the variation of one-month ahead forecasts. This is particularly true for Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Switzerland. 6 There can be several reasons for this. One-period ahead forecasts can be written as:
where u is the error associated with one-step ahead forecasts. Suppose that forecasts are efficiently constructed so that
Then, if the variation of the actual values is very large compared to the forecasts then this implies that the variance of u is very large, which means that there is significant information revealed in the last month of the year. ( , ) Figure 2 clearly supports the implications of rational expectations since variances of actual realizations are larger than 7 Large data revisions between December and June may also be responsible for high variation in u .
,1 t those of forecasts in majority of the cases. However, short-run forecasts of some countries, namely France, Germany, Denmark, Japan, and the UK seem to mildly violate this relation possibly due to measurement errors.
Information content of forecasts
Information value of a forecast is related to how accurate the forecasts are. In this section, we will provide statistics such as mean square error (MSE), mean absolute error (MAE) and Theil's U statistic along with another statistic recently proposed by Diebold and Kilian (2001) . While MSE and MAE depend on the variability of the actual process, Theil's U statistic scales the RMSE by the variability of underlying data and has the advantage of being independent of the variance of the actual process. Formally,
which compares the forecast errors with a naive forecast . If U n y h is larger than one, the forecast does not beat the naive forecast. An important issue in calculating the U h is the selection of the naive forecast. While many studies have used the no-change forecast as the naive forecast, in this study, we will use the 5-year rolling GDP growth averages two years before the end of the target year as the benchmark forecast. We also tried forecasts of no change as . One problem in using the lagged actual value as the benchmark in our case is that when the forecast horizon is more than 12 months, the forecasters do not know y n y t-1 . So the benchmark y t-1 may be considered unduly stringent. On the other hand, the benchmark y t-2 can be considered too lenient because the current year forecasts will have y t-1 known. Also, due to data revisions the lagged value may have to be changed depending on one's assumption on the forecasters' knowledge and beliefs about the latest GDP. Given that the actual GDP growth is stationary and known, rolling averages can be considered to be a more suitable and transparent benchmark.
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A measure of predictability due to Diebold and Kilian (2001) is defined as 10 ( 
Diebold and Kilian (2001) used this measure to compute the predictability of several macro variables using realized data and noted that it would be interesting to use this measure on the forecast survey data. Thus, when k-period ahead (e.g., 24 months) survey forecast is used as the naïve forecast, ( , ) p s k will give the improvement in forecasts as the horizon decreases. To the best of our knowledge, no study has ever used this statistic on survey data. The Diebold-Kilian measure of predictability shows the improvement in the information content of the forecasts as measured by the decrease in MSE over that of the 24-month ahead forecasts. As shown in Figure 3 , the predictive ability of GDP ( , 24) p h 12 For the sake of comparison, we also looked at forecast efficiency with no-change as the naïve forecast. The MSE and MAE associated with 5-year rolling average of actual values as forecasts were higher than those with y t-1 for all countries, and significantly so for most. Thus, the information requirement of y t-1 as the benchmark is very stringent. As expected, we observe that it is much harder to beat the one-year lagged GDP growth as the naïve forecast. Now, for the 24-month-ahead forecasts, U statistic is less than one for only Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the U.S.; the worst performers are Portugal, Ireland, and Netherlands. For 12-month-ahead forecasts, all countries, with the exception of Ireland and Portugal, have U statistics less than one, implying that the forecasts have value over the no-change forecast.
forecasts for some countries (e.g., Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan and USA) does not improve over the 24-month ahead forecasts when the horizon remains relatively long, but for some other countries (e.g., Germany, Ireland, Spain), each additional month increases the information content of the forecasts over the previous month even in longerrun forecasts. For most of the countries, we see that MSE substantially decreases in the short-run forecasts causing to be close to 100% when the forecast horizon is one month. Two exceptions are Norwegian and Irish GDP growth forecasts, where the final values of are less than 80%, and can possibly be explained by relatively inferior preliminary GDP data.
( , 24) p h ( , 24) p h
Timing of the most valuable information
The slopes of the plots in Figure 3 , which can be interpreted as a measure of the improvement in forecast quality over horizons, is found to be somewhat different from country to country. For example, the Norwegian curve does not have a steep slope, which implies that Norwegian forecasts do not improve rapidly with decreasing horizon, but the Japanese curve has a very steep slope implying that the forecast quality increases sharply as new information is acquired. The first measure is based on forecast errors. The second measure is based only on the forecast revisions and can be seen as the content of new information as perceived by the forecasters. Following the literature cited above, another measure of forecast improvement will be constructed from the "optimum forecasts" using the time series representation of the actual quarterly GDP growth. We do this for the purpose of comparing forecast behavior with reality.
New information based on forecast errors
The first difference in the MSE h will provide an estimate for the new information content in forecasts when the horizon is h. From equation (2) 
which is equivalent to the information content of the new information in the actual process. Now suppose that , t h f % is not an optimal forecast and is generated according to
where q denotes the largest forecast horizon at which the first forecast is reported. It defines the conditional mean of the actual process when the horizon is q, i.e., , 
where the first component on the RHS denotes the bias in the forecast, the second component denotes the errors due to inefficiency, and the third component denotes the errors due to unforecastable events after the forecast is reported. Calculating MSE and assuming that sample estimates converge to their population values, we get
Similarly calculating MSE h+1 and taking the first difference we find that
which gives the improvement in the content of the forecasts with the new information. 
New information based on forecast revisions
While the use of h MSE ∆ provides the improvement in forecasting performance at horizon h and therefore gives the information content of the news in terms of forecasting ability, a similar measure can be constructed based solely on forecasts without using the actual data on GDP growth. Notice that, based on equation (2), the optimal forecast revision is nothing but
In the sub-optimum case of equation (6), we have the forecast revision process
Calculating the mean squared revisions (MSR) and taking the probability limit we get is equivalent to overreaction to the news when the horizon is h.
Empirical comparisons
Before presenting the graphs for h MSE ∆ and MSR h , let us try to determine their plausible shapes conceptually. As shown earlier, we expect to see forecast variability to increase as new information is accumulated. If the information content in a particular period is much larger than in the previous period, we expect to see a marked increase in forecasting performance in that period.
When the forecast horizon is very short, we expect the impact of new information on forecasts to be small for two reasons. First, the impact of a shock is determined partly by the length of time for the shock to be totally absorbed by the economy. For instance, one would expect the 9/11 terrorist attack to have affected the 2002 U.S. GDP growth more that the 2001 growth. When there is not enough time for the transmission mechanisms to impact output fully, the observed effect will be small. This implies that as horizon gets smaller the impact on GDP growth of a typical shock will be correspondingly smaller. Second, since the forecast variable is yearly real GDP growth, current year forecasts will be highly driven by the quarterly real GDP announcements and data revisions during the year. So as we approach the end of the target year, a lot of information about the target will already be known and it is expected that in the last few months the impact of the information will be very small. Consequently, we expect that the new information update will be small when the forecast horizon is short. Similar to the first reasoning above, when the horizon is long and the target is next year, the total impact is expected to be small since most of the impact will be consumed before the target year even starts. Also, forecasters may be reluctant to adjust forecasts to news immediately due to uncertainty. The uncertainty factor will tend to make the news arrival curve more concentrated towards the right. Nevertheless, these observations suggest that when the horizon is too short or too long forecast revisions due to new information is expected to be small, so that we expect the impact of shocks to peak in the middle horizons. Given the regularity across countries, and in order to estimate the information arrival curve without imposing any functional from, we pooled all the countries and estimated the MSE ∆ and MSR h curves non-parametrically, see Hastie and Tibshirani (1986) .
14 These are reported in Figure 5 where we now clearly see that the peaks with both the curves come at about 14 months before the end of the target year. The shapes of the two curves when estimated non-parametrically are remarkably similar, even though MSR h exhibits a lot more adjustment towards the end of the forecasting period than
Thus, the 'currency' rather than the 'time remaining' for a unit perceived shock to affect the economy weighs more heavily in forecast revisions. It seems that the imposition of a simple quadratic polynomial on individual countries with outliers might have shifted the peaks a little to the right for some countries.
The finding that for most of the countries, the biggest adjustment of forecasts to news happens when the horizon is close to 14 months on the average and, depending on the country, it can also vary any where between September of the previous year and 13 Isiklar et al. (2006) estimate the extent of stickiness for G7 countries using the same data source, but a different methodology. See Mankiw and Reis (2001) and Sims (2003) for alternative explanations. 14 These functions were estimated based on the Spline Smoother with 3 degrees of freedom. The minimization problem was solved using Back-fitting and Local Scoring algorithms. Note that in addition to the Spline Smoother, we also used Kernel Smoother and Local Regression procedures. The results were practically the same. Allowing for fixed country effects also did not change the estimated functions. We used PROC GAM in SAS to do the calculations 
Content of new information implied in the actual process
In this section we provide a measure of new information in an "optimal" forecast, which is based on modeling the actual process. The content of the new information in the actual process can be calculated by estimating equation (1) using the actual quarterly real GDP growth data. For example, one may think of fitting an MA model on the real GDP growth series, and then treating the estimated MA coefficients as estimates for h θ coefficients. As pointed before, this approach is the main idea behind several studies in the calculations of the information content of optimal forecasts, e.g., Öller (1985) .
But, in this study the forecasts are what are called "fixed-target" forecasts. So the target variable represented by y t is not quarterly real GDP growth but annual real GDP growth. This implies that we have to make a transformation on the MA coefficients estimated using the quarterly real GDP growth series to be comparable with the annual real GDP growth forecasts.
Suppose y t denotes the annual real GDP growth as before and denotes the annualized quarterly real GDP growthuarters before the end of the year t. For (12) gives the MA representation for the actual process: The intuition behind this representation should be straightforward. While last quarter shocks have only a unique chance of having an impact on the annual GDP growth, third quarter shocks will have the chance two times: contemporaneous effect on the third quarter GDP (via 0 γ ) and then a secondary effect on the last quarter GDP growth (via 1 γ ). Similarly, first quarter shocks will have four impact coefficients. When the horizon is larger than 4 quarters, the shocks will have 4 chances to have an effect on the current year GDP growth. But in this case, there will not be any contemporaneous impact since the effect will be seen on the previous year's GDP growth.
To estimate the k γ s, we use the seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP growth and estimate ARMA models for each country. The AIC criterion was used to select the order of AR and MA terms. Then we transformed this ARMA models into a MA( ) ∞ representation, which gives us k γ s. This is a 'safe' way to get a reasonable MA representation. Direct MA modeling is an alternative way but the models may not converge under certain conditions. After getting the MA coefficients of the quarterly model, we construct the MA coefficients of the annual model using equation (15) and then calculate the optimal percentage of variation at horizon k as100
To be comparable with the survey forecast data we use the 1990-2001 period to estimate ARMA models for each country. Note that the longest horizon we are interested is two years and we use quarterly GDP growth rates to estimate the k γ s, so we have only eight observations to plot for each country. 15 For the sake of brevity and in order to see a stable "flow of information" curve, Figure 6 presents the percentage shares of 18 countries aggregated and separately only for the UK and the US by horizon. Since we use quarterly data to generate the shares, we plot each quarter's value in the center of the 15 There were outliers in the data too: Germany on 1991:1 (8.32%), Portugal on 1988:1 (15.6%), and Norway on 1997:2 (6.9%). In addition, the GDP growth rates of Spain behave abnormally during 2000:2 to 2001:1 having growth rates of 3.8, -3.04, 5.3 and -2.2 percent respectively. With these data points, the model failed to converge so we used the data until 2000:1 for Spain. Except for the Spanish case, the results were, however, not affected by the control of the outliers.
quarter. So, for example, the first estimated share of a contemporaneous shock is plotted when the horizon is 2 months. Despite small samples, the results clearly suggest an asymmetric hump-shaped adjustment with a peak at 11 months horizon. With a few exceptions, a similar pattern was found for each of the sample countries.
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We do not expect these graphs based on optimal forecasts from the actual data generating process to be exactly the same as those based on survey forecasts. First, because the flow of information curve with optimal forecasts was estimated using quarterly data, the curve will be slightly shifted to the right. Moreover, as we have 
Conclusions
In this paper we study the characteristics of monthly GDP growth forecasts for 18 developed countries during 1989-2004. We study how forecasting performance improves as the forecast horizon decreases, and at what horizons forecasts start to become informative. Since there are many forecasting organizations around the world providing forecasts for many macroeconomic variables with horizons up to two years or more, it is useful to explore the value of these forecasts, and thereby understand the limits to how far ahead today's professionals can reasonably forecast. Since the panel of forecasters in
Consensus Economics, Inc. are all private market agents, the limits to forecasting that these specialists exhibit can safely be taken as indicative of the current state of economic foresight. However, the answer from our exhaustive data analysis did not turn out to be a "single-liner". We have found wide diversity in the quality of the forecasts across countries, and the horizons at which forecasts start becoming useful, possibly reflecting the forecast difficulty of the underlying series.
We used Theil's U statistic with the 5-year rolling GDP growth as the benchmark, and another measure of predictability recently suggested by Diebold and Kilian (2001) with the 24-month ahead forecast as the benchmark. For 24-month ahead forecasts, U is less than one for all countries except for Italy and Switzerland, but very marginally. For 12-month ahead forecasts, all the countries have U statistics less than one, implying that the forecasts have predictive value. Using the Diebold-Kilian skill measure and the variance functions, we however found that for majority of the countries the longer-term forecasts for up to 18 months are no better than the initial 24-month ahead forecasts. That is, over these longer horizons, forecasters do not receive dependable information to adjust their forecasts. We also observed a similar pattern when we looked at the horizons at which the survey forecasts beat the naïve no-change forecast. These findings imply that the survey forecasts do not have much value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months.
In this paper we have proposed two alternative approaches to measure the flow content of new information in survey forecasts. The first measure is based on the improvement in actual forecasting performance over horizons, and the second measure is based on forecast revisions that can be considered as a measure of the importance of new information as perceived by forecasters. Whereas the latter can be interpreted as a measure of how forecasters interpret the importance of news in real time, the former is the ex post "prize" they get as a result of revising their forecasts. Under rationality and without much unforeseen errors in the sample period, these two approaches should yield similar results. Using nonparametric methods, we found that both the approaches indicate the largest improvement in forecasting performance comes when the forecast horizon is around 14 months. U statistic uses 5 year rolling average GDP growth as the naïve forecast. 
